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Abstract
Earlier studies of the seigniorage inflation model have found that the high-inflation steady
state is not stable under adaptive learning. We reconsider this issue and analyze the full set of
solutions for the linearized model. Our main focus is on stationary hyperinflationary paths
near the high-inflation steady state. The hyperinflationary paths are stable under learning if
agents can utilize contemporaneous data. However, in an economy populated by a mixture of
agents, some of whom only have access to lagged data, stable inflationary paths emerge only
if the proportion of agents with access to contemporaneous data is sufficiently high.
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The monetary inﬂation model, in which the demand for real balances de-
pends negatively on expected inﬂation and the government uses seigniorage
to fund in part its spending on goods, has two steady states and also perfect
foresight paths that converge to the high inﬂation steady state.1 The paths
converging towards the high steady state have occasionally been used as a
model of hyperinﬂation, see e.g. (Fischer 1984), (Bruno 1989) and (Sargent
and Wallace 1987). However, this approach remains controversial for several
reasons. First, the high inﬂation steady state has “perverse” comparative
static properties since an increase in seigniorage leads to lower steady state
inﬂation. Second, recent studies of stability under learning of the high in-
ﬂation steady state suggest that this steady state may not be a plausible
equilibrium.
(Marcet and Sargent 1989) and (Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon 2001)
have shown that the high inﬂation steady state is unstable for various ver-
sion of least squares learning. (Adam 2003) has obtained the same result
for a sticky price versions of the monetary inﬂation model with monopolistic
competition. (Arifovic 1995) has examined the model under genetic algo-
rithm learning and the economy appears always to converge to the steady
state with low, rather than high inﬂation. Experimental work by (Marimon
and Sunder 1993) also comes to the conclusion that the high inﬂation steady
state is not a plausible outcome in the monetary inﬂation model.
The instability result for the high inﬂation steady state under learning has
been derived under a particular assumption about the information sets that
agents are assumed to have. (Van Zandt and Lettau 2003) raise questions
about the timing and information sets in the context of learning steady states.
They show that, under what is often called constant gain learning, the high
inﬂation steady state in the Cagan model can be stable under learning with
speciﬁc informational assumptions.2 In a related but diﬀerent model, (Duﬀy
1994) showed the possibility of expectationally stable dynamic paths near an
indeterminate steady state.
The monetary inﬂation model, like that of (Duﬀy 1994), has the im-
portant feature that the temporary equilibrium inﬂation rate in period t
1The model is also called the Cagan model after (Cagan 1956) .
2However, constant gain learning is most natural in nonstochastic models, since other-
wise convergence to REE is precluded. In this paper we allow for intrinsic random shocks
and thus use “decreasing gain” algorithms, consistent with least squares learning.
2depends on the private agents’ one-step ahead forecasts of inﬂation made
in two successive periods, t − 1a n dt. Except for some partial results in
(Duﬀy 1994) and (Adam 2003), the diﬀerent types of rational expectations
equilibria (REE) in such “mixed dating models” have not been examined for
stability under learning. In this paper we consider this issue, paying careful
attention to diﬀerent possible information sets that agents might have. In
particular, we show that stationary AR(1) paths, as well associated sunspot
equilibria around an indeterminate steady state, such as the high inﬂation
steady state, are stable under learning when agents have access to contempo-
raneous data of endogenous variables. However, this result is sensitive to the
information assumption. If the economy has suﬃciently many agents who
base their forecasts only on lagged information, then the results are changed
and the equilibria just mentioned become unstable under learning.
2T h e h y p e r i n ﬂation model
In the standard hyperinﬂation model real money demand is a linearly de-
creasing function of expected inﬂation, i.e.
m
d
t = ψ0 − ψ1E
∗
txt+1 with ψ0 >ψ 1 > 0
where md
t denotes real money demand and xt+1 the inﬂation factor from t to
t +1 . H e r eE∗
txt+1 denotes expected inﬂation, which we do not restrict to
be fully rational (we will reserve Etxt+1 for rational expectations). Money
demand functions of the above form can be generated by monetary overlap-
ping generations models with log-utility functions. Alternatively they can be
viewed as a log-version of the (Cagan 1956) demand function.
Real money supply ms






+ g + vt
where mt−1 denotes the real value of outstanding balances in t − 1, g is
the mean value of real seigniorage, and vt is a stochastic seigniorage term
assumed to be white noise with small bounded support and zero mean.3 This
formulation of the seigniorage equation is standard, see e.g. (Sargent and
3More generally the monetary shock could be allowed to be a martingale diﬀerence
sequence with small bounded support.
3Wallace 1987) . The above equation simply states that government purchases
of goods is ﬁnanced by printing money, i.e. g +vt =( Ms
t −Mt−1)/Pt,w h e r e
Mt denotes the nominal money stock and Pt the price of goods, so that
mt = Mt/Pt and xt = Pt/Pt−1. It would also be straightforward to allow for
a ﬁxed amount of government purchases ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes.















there exist two noisy steady states, with diﬀerent mean inﬂation rates x,
given by the quadratic
ψ1x
2 − (ψ1 + ψ0 − g)x + ψ0 =0 . (2)
We denote the low inﬂation steady state by xl and the high inﬂation steady
state by xh. Throughout the paper we will assume that g<g max so that
both steady states exist. As shown in Appendix A.1, the low inﬂation steady
state is locally unique, while there is a continuum of stationary REE in a
neighborhood of the high inﬂation steady state.
The model (1) can be linearized around either steady state, leading to a
reduced form that ﬁts into a general mixed dating expectations model taking
the form
xt = α + β1E
∗
t xt+1 + β0E
∗
t−1xt + ut, (3)
where ut is a positive scalar times vt. It is convenient to study learning within
the context of the linearized model (3), and this has the advantage that our
results can also be used to discuss related models with the same linearized
reduced form, e.g. the one of (Duﬀy 1994).
The linearization of the hyperinﬂa t i o nm o d e li sd i s c u s s e di nd e t a i li n
Appendix A.1. We here note that equation (1) implies β1 > 0a n dβ0 <
0 for the linearization at either steady state. Furthermore the coeﬃcients








43T h e m i x e d d a t i n g m o d e l
We start by determining the complete set of rational expectations equilibria
for model (3). These can be obtained as follows. In a rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) the forecast error
ηt = xt − Et−1xt
is a martingale diﬀerence sequence (MDS), which together with (3) implies
that
xt = α + β1(xt+1 + ηt+1)+β0(xt + ηt)+ut.
Solving for xt+1 and lagging the equation by one period delivers
xt = −β
−1
1 α + β
−1
1 (1 − β0)xt−1 + ηt + β
−1
1 β0ηt−1 − β
−1
1 ut−1
One can decompose the arbitrary MDS ηt into a component that is correlated
with ut and an orthogonal sunspot η
0
t :




t is again a MDS. Moreover, since ηt is an arbitrary MDS, the
coeﬃcients γ0 and γ1 are free to take on any values. This delivers the full


















Since γ0 and γ1 are arbitrary there is a continuum of ARMA(1,1) sunspot
equilibria.
For γ0 =1a n dγ1 = 0 we obtain the stochastic steady state solution
xt = α(1 − β1 − β0)
−1 +( 1− β1 − β0)
−1ut, (5)
while setting γ0 = β
−1
0 and γ1 = 0 yields an AR(1) solution
xt = −β
−1
1 α + β
−1
1 (1 − β0)xt−1 + β
−1
0 ut (6)
For the hyperinﬂation model, stability of steady state solutions (5) has
been studied in (Marcet and Sargent 1989)4 and (Evans, Honkapohja, and
4Marcet and Sargent actually formulate the forecasting problem in terms of forecasting
the price level.
5Marimon 2001). In this paper, we will examine the stability of the full set of
ARMA(1,1) solutions (4) and how their stability under learning is aﬀected by
the information sets. As shown in Appendix A.1, the ARMA(1,1) solutions
near the high inﬂation steady state are stationary because 0 <β
−1
1 (1−β0) <
1 for the linearization at xh.
4 Learning with full current information
We ﬁrst consider the situation where agents have information about all vari-
ables up to time t and wish to learn the parameters of the rational expecta-
tions solution (4). As is well-known, the conditions for local stability under
adaptive learning are given by expectational stability (E-stability) conditions.
Therefore, we ﬁrst discuss the E-stability conditions for the REE, after which
we take up real time learning.
4.1 E-stability
Agents’ perceived law of motion (PLM) of the state variable xt is given by
xt = a + bxt−1 + cut−1 + dη
0
t−1 + ζt (7)
where the parameters (a,b,c,d) are not known to the agent but are estimated
by least-squares, and ζt represents unforecastable noise.
Substituting the expectations generated by the PLM (7) into the model
(3) delivers the actual law of motion (ALM) for the state variable xt:
xt =( 1− β1b)
−1 [α +( β1 + β0)a]( 8 )
+( 1− β1b)
−1 £






The map from the parameters in the PLM to the corresponding parameters
6in the ALM, the T-map in short, is given by
a →











Since the variables entering the ALM also show up in the PLM, the ﬁxed
points of the T-map are rational expectations equilibria. Furthermore, as is
easy to verify, all REE’s are also ﬁxed points of the T-map.
Local stability of a REE under least squares learning of the parameters
in (7) is determined by the stability of the diﬀerential equation
d(a,b,c,d)
dτ
= T(a,b,c,d) − (a,b,c,d)( 9 )
at the REE. This is known as the E-stability diﬀerential equation, and the
connection to least squares learning is discussed more generally and at length
in (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). If an REE is locally asymptotically stable
under (9) then the REE is said to be “expectationally stable” or “E-stable.”







































1 (1 − β0) (12)
c,d : arbitrary












Figure 1: Regions of E-stable ARMA equilibria
The eigenvectors corresponding to the last two eigenvalues are those pointing
into the direction of c and d, respectively. As one would expect, stability in
the point-wise sense cannot hold for these parameters and in contexts such as
these, E-stability is deﬁned relative to the whole class of ARMA equilibria.
A class of REE is said then said to be E-stable if the dynamics under (9)
converge to some member of the class from all initial points suﬃciently near
the class. We can then summarize the preceding analysis:
Proposition 1 If β1 > 0 and β0 < 0 or if β1 < 0 and β0 > 1 the set of
ARMA(1,1)-REE is E-stable.
Figure 1 illustrates these conditions in the (β0,β1)-space. The dark grey
region indicates parameter values for which the ARMA equilibria are E-stable
but explosive. If β1 and β0 lies in the textured region, then the ARMA
equilibria are both E-stable and stochastically stationary.
Since β1 > 0a n dβ0 < 0 for the high steady state in the hyperinﬂation
8model, Proposition 1 implies that the set of stationary ARMA(1,1)-REE is
E-stable.
We remark that Proposition 1 applies to any model with reduced form
(3). In particular, in the model of (Duﬀy 1994) we have −β1 = β0 > 1, and
thus this proposition conﬁrms his E-stability result for the stationary AR(1)
solutions and, more generally, proves E-stability for stationary ARMA(1,1)
sunspot solutions.
4.2 Real time learning
Next we consider real time learning of the set of ARMA equilibria (4). This
section shows that stochastic approximation theory can be applied to show
convergence of least squares learning when the PLM of the agents has AR(1)
form and the economy can converge to the locally determinate AR(1) equilib-
rium (6). For technical reasons the stochastic approximation tools cannot be
applied for the continuum of ARMA(1,1)-REE. Therefore, real time learning
of the class (4) REE will be considered in section 7 using simulations.
Assume ﬁrst that agents have the PLM of AR(1) form, i.e.
xt = a + bxt−1 + ζt. (13)
The parameters a and b are updated using recursive least squares using data
through period t, so that the forecasts are given by
E
∗
txt+1 = at + btxt,
E
∗
t−1xt = at−1 + bt−1xt−1.
Substituting these forecasts into (3) yields the ALM
xt =



























where Rt is the matrix of second moments, which will be explicitly speciﬁed
in the Appendix, and ϑt is the gain sequence, which is a decreasing sequence
such as t−1.5 In Appendix A.2 we prove the following result:
5See Chapter 2 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) for the recursive formulation of least
squares estimation.
9Proposition 2 The AR(1) equilibrium of model (3) is stable under least
squares learning (15) if the model parameters satisfy the E-stability conditions
β1 > 0 and β0 < 0 or β1 < 0 and β0 > 1.
Since E-stability governs the stability of the AR(1) solution under least
squares learning, the stationary AR(1) solutions in the hyperinﬂation model
are learnable. The same result holds for the AR(1) solution in a stochastic
version of the model of (Duﬀy 1994).
5 Learning without observing current states
The observability of current states, as assumed in the previous section, in-
troduces a simultaneity between expectations and current outcomes. Tech-
nically this is reﬂected in xt appearing on both sides of the equation when
substituting the PLM (7) into the model (3). To obtain the ALM one ﬁrst
has to solve this equation for xt. Although this is straightforward mathe-
matically, it is not clear what economic mechanism would ensure consistency
between xt and the expectations based on xt. Moreover, in the non-linear
formulation there may even exist multiple mutually consistent price and price
expectations pairs, as pointed out in (Adam 2003).
To study the role of the precise information assumption, we introduce a
fraction of agents who cannot observe the current state xt. Such agents in
eﬀect must learn to make forecasts that are consistent with current outcomes,
which allows us to consider the robustness of the preceding results. Thus
suppose that a share λ of agents has information set
H
0




t−1,...,x t−1,x t−2 ...)
and cannot observe the current state xt. Let the remaining agents have the
“full t”-information set




t−1,...,x t,x t−1 ...)
Expectations based on H0
t are denoted by E0∗
t [·] and expectations based on
Ht by E∗
t [·].
With the relevant economic expectations given by the average expecta-
tions across agents, the economic model (3) can now be written as














10As before, the PLM of agents with information set Ht will be given by
xt = a2 + b2xt−1 + c2ut−1 + d2η
0
t−1 + ζt
while the PLM for agents with information set H
0
t is given by







Here ζt and ζ
0
t represent zero mean disturbances that are uncorrelated with
all variables in the respective information sets. Since agents with information
set H
0
t do not know xt, they must ﬁrst forecast xt to be able to forecast xt+1.
The forecast of xt depends on the current shocks ut and η0
t, which implies
that these agents must estimate e1 and f1 to be able to forecast.
Agents’ expectations are now given by
E
∗





t [xt+1]=a1 + b1E
0∗
t [xt]+c1ut + d1η
0
t
= a1 + b1
£






+ c1ut + d1η
0
t
= a1(1 + b1)+b
2
1xt−1 +( b1e1 + c1)ut





a n dt h ei m p l i e dA L Mc a nb ew r i t t e na s







where zt =( xt,x t−1,u t,u t−1,η0
t,η0
t−1) and where the expressions for A, B,
and C can be found in Appendix A.3.1.
It is important to note that the ALM is an ARMA(2,2) process and
therefore of higher order than agents’ PLM. This is due to the presence
of agents with H0
t information. These agents use variables dated t − 2t o
forecast xt. This feature has several important implications. First, while
the T-map is given by the coeﬃcients showing up in the ARMA(2,2)-ALM
(16), calculating the ﬁxed points of the learning process now requires us to
project the ARMA(2,2)-ALM back onto the ARMA(1,1) parameter space.
Second, it might appear that the resulting ﬁxed points of the T-map would
not constitute rational expectations equilibria, but rather what have been
called “restricted perceptions equilibria’ (RPE). RPE have the property that
11agents’ forecasts are optimal within the class of PLMs considered by agents,
but not within a more general class of models.6
Because our agents estimate ARMA(1,1) models, and under the current
information assumptions ARMA(1,1) PLMs generate ARMA(2,2) ALMs,
there is clearly the possibility that convergence will be to an RPE that is
not an REE. However, as we will show below, convergence will be to an
ARMA(2,2) process that can be regarded as an overparameterized ARMA(1,1)
REE. Therefore, the misspeciﬁcation by agents is transitional and disappears
asymptotically.
The projection of the ARMA(2,2)-ALM on the ARMA(1,1)-PLM is ob-
tained as follows. Under the assumption that zt is stationary equation (16)
implies



















































































1/β1−(1−λ)b2 (B11 + B12)
where A11, B11,a n dB12 are elements of the ALM coeﬃcients A and B,a s
given in Appendix A.3.1. This completes the projection of the ARMA(2,2)-
ALM onto the ARMA(1,1)-PLM.
Using Mathematica one can then show that the following parameters are
ﬁxed points of the T-map:
(a1,b 1,e 1,c 1,f 1,d 1,a 2,b 2,c 2,d 2)
=( −α/β1,−ρ,γ0,γ0ρ − 1/β1,γ1,γ1ρ,−α/β1,−ρ,γ0ρ − 1/β1,γ1ρ) (18)
6The issue of projecting a higher-order ALM back to a lower-order PLM ﬁrst arose in





γ0,γ1 : arbitrary constants
Note that the PLMs of agents with information set Ht and H0
t is the
same (up to the coeﬃcients showing up in front of the additional regressors
of H0
t-agents). This is not surprising since agents observe the same variables
and estimate the same PLMs.
It might appear surprising that the PLM-parameters in (18) are indepen-
dent of the share λ of agents with information set H0
t.T h i si s b e c a u s e o n e
m i g h te x p e c tt h a tt h ev a l u eo fλ would aﬀect the importance the second lags
in the ALM (18) and therefore inﬂuence the projection of the ARMA(2,2)-
A L Mo n t ot h eP L M s .H o w e v e r ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h i si sn o tt r u ea tt h e





















−β1ρ − λ + β1ρλ
β1ρ(λ − 1) − λ
+
−ρλ + β1ρ2λ
β1ρ(λ − 1) − λ
L
A =
α((1 + ρ)λ − β1ρ(−1+λ + ρλ))
β1(β1ρ(λ − 1) − λ)
.
The ARMA(2,2)-ALM (16) has a common factor in the lag polynomials.
Canceling the common factor A(L) in (19) gives the ARMA(1,1)-REE (4).
From ρ =
β0
β1 it can be seen that the resulting ARMA(1,1) process is precisely
the ARMA(1,1) REE (4).
To summarize the preceding argument, the ALM is a genuine ARMA(2,2)
process during the learning transition and this is underparameterized by the
agents estimating an ARMA(1,1). However, provided learning converges,
this misspeciﬁcation becomes asymptotically negligible. As in the case of the
ARMA(1,1)-REE, E-stability of the ARMA(1,1) ﬁxed points are determined
by the eigenvalues of the matrix
dT
d(a1,b 1,e 1,c 1,f 1,d 1,a 2,b 2,c 2,d 2)
(20)
13evaluated at the ﬁxed points.
As a ﬁrst application of our setting, we consider the model of (Duﬀy
1994), which depends on a single parameter because −β1 = β0 > 1. Using
Mathematica to derive analytical expressions for the eigenvalues of (20), one







Thus, in this model the ARMA(1,1)-REE become unstable if a high enough
share of agents does not observe current endogenous variables.
We now turn to our main application, i.e. the hyperinﬂation model.
6T h e h y p e r i n ﬂation model reconsidered
We now consider the stability of the ARMA(1,1)-REE in the hyperinﬂation
model when a share λ of agents has information H0
t and the remaining agents
have information Ht.W eﬁrst examine the case of small amounts of seignior-
age ξ → 0, for which the expressions for the linearization coeﬃcients and the
equilibrium coeﬃcients become particularly simple. We then present some
results for the general case ξ>0.
6.1 Small amounts of seigniorage
















From equation (18) it then follows that in the ARMA(1,1)-REE are given by
(a1,b 1,e 1,c 1,f 1,d 1,a 2,b 2,c 2,d 2)
=( 0 ,ω,γ0,−γ0ω,γ1,−γ1ω,0,ω,−γ0ω,−γ1ω).









Figure 2: Critical value of λ,s m a l ld e ﬁcit case (ξ →0)
E-stability of the ARMA(1,1)-REE is determined by the eigenvalues of
the T-map. Analytical expressions for the eigenvalues are given in Appendix
A.3.2. Four of these eigenvalues are equal to zero. Two eigenvalues are equal
to one. The latter correspond to the eigenvectors pointing into the direction
of the arbitrary constants γ0 and γ1. The remaining four eigenvalues si
(i =1 ,...,4) are functions of ω and λ, and we compute numerical stability
results.
For λ values lying above the line shown in Figure 2 the ARMA(1,1) class of
REE is E-unstable. A suﬃcient condition for instability is λ>1/2( s i n c e
then s1 > 1).
6.2 The intermediate and large deﬁcit case
Using the analytical expressions for the eigenvalues of the matrix (20) we used
numerical methods to determine critical share λ for which the ARMA(1,1)-
REE becomes E-unstable for positive values of the deﬁcit share ξ.F i g u r e3
displays the critical λ values for ξ values of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.95, respectively.
For λ values lying above the lines shown in these ﬁgures, the ARMA(1,1)
class of REE is E-unstable. For λ values below these lines the equilibria
remain E-stable.
15 












Figure 3: Critical value of λ, intermediate and large deﬁcit case
The ﬁgure suggests that λ>0.5 continues to be a suﬃcient condition for
E-instability of the ARMA(1,1) REE. However, critical values for λ appear
generally to be smaller than 0.5, with critical values signiﬁcantly lower if ω
is small and ξ is high. Moreover, when ω =0a n dξ → 1, these equilibria
become unstable even if an arbitrarily small share of agents does not observe
the current values of xt.
7S i m u l a t i o n s
Because formal real time learning results cannot be proved for the ARMA(1,1)
sunspot solutions, we here present simulations of the model under learning.
These indicate that the E-stability results do indeed provide the stability
conditions of this class of solutions under least-squares learning. In the il-
lustrative simulations we set β1 =2a n dβ0 = −0.5a n dα =0 . F o rt h e s e
reduced form parameters the values of a and b at the ARMA(1,1) REE are
a =0a n db =0 .75. For these reduced form parameters the ARMA(1,1)
REE are E-stable for λ = 0, see Figure 1, and convergent parameter paths
are indeed obtained under recursive least squares learning. The parameter
estimates for a typical simulation, shown in Figures 4 and 5, are converging
toward equilibrium values of the set of ARMA(1,1) REE.
In Figures 6 and 7 the share of agents with information set H0
t is increased
to λ =0 .5 and the ARMA(1,1) sunspot equilibria become unstable under
16 












Figure 4: Example of convergence when λ =0
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Figure 5: Example of convergence when λ =0
17 













Figure 6: Example of divergence when λ =0 .5
 














Figure 7: Example of divergence when λ =0 .5
18learning. For example, at and bt are clearly diverging from the values of the
ARMA(1,1) REE.
These simulation results illustrate on the one hand the possibility of least
squares learning converging to stationary solutions near the high inﬂation
steady state. On the other hand these results also show that stability de-
pends sensitively on the information available to agents when their inﬂation
forecasts are made.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the plausibility of stationary hyperinﬂation
paths in the monetary inﬂation model by analyzing their stability under
adaptive learning. The analysis has been conducted using a reduced form
that has wider applicability. For the hyperinﬂation model, if agents can ob-
serve current endogenous variables at the time of forecasting then stationary
hyperinﬂation paths of the AR(1) and ARMA(1,1) form, as well as asso-
ciated sunspot solutions, are stable under learning. Although this suggests
that these equilibria may provide a plausible explanation of hyperinﬂationary
episodes, the ﬁnding is not robust to changes in agents’ information set. In
particular, if a signiﬁcant share of agents cannot observe current endogenous
variables when forming expectations, the stationary hyperinﬂation paths be-
come unstable under learning.
A Appendices: Technical Details
A.1 Linearization of hyperinﬂation model
Equation (2), which speciﬁes the steady states, can be rewritten as
x
2 −


























Note that β1 > 0a n dβ0 < 0. We remark that −β0 is the elasticity of real
m o n e yd e m a n dw i t hr e s p e c tt oi n ﬂation and that β1 = −β0x.
For the linearized model the AR(1) or ARMA(1,1) solutions of the form
(4) are stationary if and only if the autoregressive parameter β
−1
1 (1−β0) > 0
is smaller than one. Since
β
−1
1 (1 − β0)=
ψ0
ψ1x2,
it follows that the solutions (4) are stationary near the high inﬂation steady
state xh, but explosive near the low inﬂation steady state xl.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We start by deﬁning yt−1 =( 1 ,x t−2)0. With this notation we write the
updating for the matrix of second moments as
Rt = Rt−1 + ϑt(yt−1y
0
t−1 − Rt−1)
and make a timing change St = Rt+1 in order to write recursive least squares
(RLS) estimation as a stochastic recursive algorithm (SRA). In terms of St
we have







t − St−1) (22)
and
St−1 = St−2 + ϑt(yt−1y
0
t−1 − St−2) (23)
for the periods t and t − 1 . F o ru p d a t i n go ft h ee s t i m a t e so ft h eP L M































































With this notation the equations for parameter updating are in the standard
form
φt = φt−1 + ϑtQ(t,φt−1,Xt), (26)
where the function Q(t,φt−1,Xt)i sd e ﬁned by (22), (23), (24) and (25). We
also write (14) in terms of general functional notation as
xt = xa(φt)+xb(φt)xt−1 + xu(φt)ut.























































Xt = A(φt−1)Xt−1 + B(φt−1)υt, (27)
where υt =( 1 ,u t−1)0.
The system (26) and (27) is a standard form for SRAs. Chapters 6 and
7 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) discuss the techniques for analyzing the
convergence of SRAs. The convergence points and the conditions for conver-
gence of dynamics generated by SRAs can be analyzed in terms of an asso-
ciated ordinary diﬀerential equation (ODE). The SRA dynamics converge to
an equilibrium point φ
∗ when φ
∗ is locally asymptotically ﬁxed point of the
associated diﬀerential equation. We now derive the associated ODE for our
model.












Deﬁning  t−1(φ)=xt−1 − a − bxt−2 we compute












































= M(φ) − S1,
where the temporary notation of variables with/without the subscript 1 refers
to the t and t − 1 dating in the system (22), (23), (24) and (25).
A variant of the standard argument shows that stability of the ODE is



























Next we linearize the small ODE at the ﬁxed point a = a1 = a∗ ≡− β
−1
1 α,
b = b1 = b∗ ≡ β
−1
1 (1 − β0). The derivative of (28) at the ﬁxed point can be


























22The eigenvalues of DX are clearly zero and the remaining two roots are
1+β
−1
0 β1 and β
−1
0 . The local stability condition for the small ODE and
hence the condition for local convergence the RLS learning as given in the
statement of Proposition 2.
A.3 Details on the Model with a Mixture of Agents
A.3.1 The ALM when some agents do not observe current states














































where ς =( 1 /β1 − (1 − λ)b2)−1 and
B11 = λb
2




B13 = λb1c1 + ρ(λ(b1e1 + c1)+( 1− λ)c2)
B14 = ρλb1c1
B15 = λb1d1 + ρ(λ(b1f1 + d1)+( 1− λ)d2)
B16 = ρλb1d1
23A.3.2 Eigenvalues in the small deﬁcit case
For the hyperinﬂation model with a mixture of agents, the eigenvalues of the
derivative of the T-map at the ARMA(1,1)-solution near the high-inﬂation
























s5 = s6 =1






4λ(−4+5 λ) − 4ρ
2(1 − 3λ +2 λ
2))
and ρ = −ω.
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